How Rostec "drowns" the aircraft industry

At the disposal of Rucriminal.info was a certificate of the situation in the civil aviation industry in August 2022 and we are familiar with it to readers.

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1. The situation in the industry began to deteriorate rapidly in 2018-2019, when it was decided to introduce the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) into the Rostec State Corporation and at the same time the United States tightened sanctions pressure on the UAC. This slowed down the supply of components for the Superjet and MS-21 projects, which gave grounds to additionally allocate budget funds for import substitution and forcing projects in the amount of about 300 billion rubles.


2. Extremely complicated the production and management situation and led to inefficient use of budgetary funds by the ill-conceived and unjustified entry of UAC into Rostec. All UAC structures, including the IFC leasing company and the RedWings company, were obliged to make purchases through the Rostec system, which was formed for the needs of the defense industry, and therefore is not designed to provide civilian industries. Procurement of components and materials began to stretch for 12-18 months, emergency delivery of spare parts in an AOG situation (aircraft on the ground) is not feasible due to the standards established by Rostec.


3. An inefficient and unprecedented in world and domestic management practice four-level organizational structure was formed — the Ministry of Industry and Trade-Rostec — UAC — enterprises, which slowed down the speed of decisions made by four to five times, including on operational development topics, which led to the deadening of budgetary resources and their deposition on accounts in commercial banks at a contractual percentage. The UAC staff reached 1,100 units, 30% more than in the structure of the Minaviaprom of the USSR, which does not have information technology, with a production volume 15-20 times higher in kind. This huge administrative apparatus controls the no less numerous staff of the parent Rostec, making key decisions and duplicating the functions of the UAC, which are not stipulated by legal regulations.


5. All enterprises of the industry were transferred to a single share with the transfer of the functions of a single executive body of the UAC. This led to the elimination of the economic and managerial independence of all enterprises of the holding, virtually paralyzing their operational activities and the ability to work in a self-adjusting mode necessary for breakthrough organizational and design solutions. The extremely complicated scheme itself, in which the management of enterprises throughout the country is carried out from the capital center, was exacerbated by the insufficient level of qualifications of top managers of the UAC, most of whom do not have specialized education and work experience in design, production or marketing fields.


6. The liquidation of the institute of general designers had a very negative effect on the speed and quality of promising developments. The replacement of this institution by technical councils in the main design areas has led to the erosion of personal responsibility and fruitless discussions on various special topics, often dictated by corporate or personal interests.


7. These factors have led to catastrophic staff turnover in the KLA. The constant change of heads of leading design bureaus and plants led to the loss of continuity, lack of self-confidence, unwillingness to make decisions that involve risk. Even more blunted the desire to take responsibility from the new leaders the opening of fake criminal cases against the leading leaders of the KLA in retaliation for disloyalty and unwillingness to engage in financial fraud.


So, in the Ilyushin Design Bureau since 2013, 5 general directors have already changed, in the Tupolev Design Bureau since 2009, already 5 general directors have changed, in the GSS (now Irkut) since its inception, 9 managers have changed, the average term of each of them did not exceed 2 years old. Some of the leaders (Konyukhov A.V.), others had no experience at all in the design bureau (R.N. Sharipov). A similar personnel reshuffle is taking place at other UAC enterprises, including factories. Thus, VASO (Voronezh) has changed 6 general directors over the past 10 years, a similar situation has developed at the Aviastar plant in Ulyanovsk.


8. As a result, not a single main program for the creation of domestic civil aviation equipment was completed either in terms of time or in terms of the quality of development and import substitution. Relatively good results in light aviation (the TVRS-44 program and the LMS-901 program), which, however, disrupted the dates for the transition to domestic components (American engine), which postpones the start of mass production and export contracting.


9. The combination of these factors makes it possible to predict that the additional 15 billion rubles allocated for the “expansion of MS-21 production” (which has not even begun!) Will not be effectively used according to the precedent. It is necessary to comprehensively reform the civil aviation industry on the basis of information technologies, using the experience of creating a managerial core in the government apparatus (Analytical and Coordinating Centers) and reducing the inefficient superstructures entangled in corporate and personal ties in the Rostec State Corporation and the Ministry of Industry and Trade.


To be continued


Timofey Zabiyakin


Источник: “https://rucriminal.info/en/material/kak-rostex-topit-aviastroenie”

Источник: Times